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Bullhorn of Totalitarian Propaganda

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Murder of Mozgovoy – by whom and for what? Part no. 1
NKVD Officer
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Over Yesterday I collected a number of facts on this murder here:  http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2198417.html (in Russian)
My personal view of Aleksey Mozgovoy was described here:
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2198649.html

Now let's look at the proposed versions.


The following versions are put up as of today.

1. Mozgovoy was killed by the AFU SRG (sabotage/reconnaissance group) or by the embedded SBU group, as a part of a successfully performed spec op.
2. Mozgovoy was eliminated by "our side", due to his opposition to the official political line.
3. Mozgovoy was killed by the local criminal circles because he impeded criminal activity in Alchevsk.
4. Mozgovoy was eliminated by some third party with the goal of triggering an internal upheaval in the republic and a subsequent "dump" of the people's republics by Moscow.

Lets consider these versions based on the known facts.

Data



On May 23rd at 17:50 MSK at the exit from Mikhaylovka to the Lugansk–Alchevsk road, Alexey Mozgovoy's motorcade was ambushed. After a triggered explosion (according to one version this was an anti-personnel mine, according to another version it was an IED), heavy fire was opened on the vehicles that were driving on the road at close range using assault rifles and LMGs. The liquidators knew for sure who and when will be driving in this place, so Mozgovoy's motorcade was effectively driving into a trap that was prepared in advance, Mozgovoy and his companions had effectively no chance to survive. According to the preliminary data, 6 more people died together with Alexey Mozgovoy.
The murder site with the bodies of the dead is shown in the video below.

Caution, the video is 18+


As it is not hard to see, the vehicles were primarily hit by automatic fire, which is evidenced by numerous bullet holes (most likely, all of them of the 7.62 caliber). Exactly who was shooting remains unclear at this moment, so speaking of who benefits and who could order and execute this, we can't say for sure but rather are forced to make conclusions based on circumstantial evidence and motives.
Now let's go over the versions, starting from the least probable, which is associated with criminal circles.

Criminal Circles



On the one side, the local crime bosses indeed had serious motives to get rid of Aleksey Mozgovoy, who was a serious obstacle for conducting "business" in Alchevsk (he was receiving persistent threats due to this  http://www.rg.ru/2015/05/23/gibel-anons.html) by not getting involved in large-scale schemes of expropriation and coal trading. That is why it is certain that in Alchevsk and the neighboring territories there were people who wanted Aleksey dead and were quite jubilant when he died. However, the nature of the attack and the precise data of vehicles location doesn't suggest that the murder was carried out by some local bandit group. How an attack by bandits against the commander looks like could be seen in the recent story of an attempt on "Givi"s livehttp://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2097806.html, where, after disarming the Makeyevka's commandant office and the arrest of "Murky", "Givi"s car was shot at using automatic rifles from a moving car in the style of the "90's showdowns". This is approximately how the local crime acts. In the case of Mozgovoy's murder everything suggests that a certain spec op took place, which required serious preparatory work on determining the route of Mozgovoy's movement, selecting the place for ambush for the determined route, the deployment of highly qualified people with subsequent covert retreat. All of the above suggests that this was not an amateur job but that it was done by professionals (either military or special service). The mission of eliminating Mozgovoy was a 100% success. In theory it can be proposed that this question was solved for money that that some unit agreed to eliminate the brigade commander, but from my point of view this is unlikely, because the risk of simply "cleaning" the participants of such schemes is very high once the information about this will reach the military counter-intelligence or at least the Ministry for State Security. So, in this respect, I view the "criminal" version as the least probable, even though it cannot be completely ruled out, because there is a possibility of the local criminals assisting the murderers.


Torez administration after the attack that was organized by the joint efforts of the SBU, Lyashko, and "Abelmas".

Here we can also give an example of Ruslan Onishenko, a crime boss from Torez, who cooperated with the SBU even before forming the "Shakhtyorsk" punitive battalion http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2094586.html (in Russian) and took part in murdering DPR activists. Later, under a callsign of "Abelmas" he first became the deputy commander of "Shakhtyorsk" and later he became the commander of the MIA battalion "Tornado" http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2152889.html (where among him other crime bosses were gathered, a significant proportion of whom were wanted already during the times of Yanukovich regime).


Translation of the text shown above: We need the lists exactly for May 11! The heads and the deputies of the commisions. Tomorrow I'll wake up, get sober, and call. Thanks in advance.

A request by the SBU contact to "Abelmas".


Translation of the text shown above: For goodness sake, don't show up in the coming days. You don't know me. Farewell.

From the SMS-correspondence between "Abelmas" and his SBU contact.

Overall, speaking of this version — there was a motive, the capabilities for independent fulfillment of the threats to Mozogovoy were limited.
So, speaking of the criminal trace in Mozgovoy's murder, it cannot be ruled out that it may not have been the main reason for the death of the brigade leader but could play some role, especially given the fact that the local organized crime works on both sides of the front line.

Arguments in the LPR


Plotnitsky, Mozgovoy, and Kozitsyn

A more popular version is that Mozgovoy's murder was contracted by Plotnitsky or somebody else in the LPR leadership.
It is no secret that Mozgovoy had serious arguments with the republican leadership since September 2014, as a part of intense feuding inside the LPR on the subject of the LPR structure and reporting to Plotnitsky.

The principal stages of these developments.


Blue – territories under the control of the "Cossack national guard"
Grey – transitional territories
Green – territories under the control of the "LPR" group.


1. In September 2014, on the background of the continued anarchy in the LPR (with which even the vacationeer-mentors couldn't cope with — the mission of "Elbrus" and "Dolphin" failed, the coordination HQs in Krasnodon didn't work properly in the end), Mozgovoy tried to gather a council of the field commanders of the DPR and the LPR and to elect the supreme commander of the NAF military there. But due to the internal tensions among the commanders the planned council failed — few people responded to Mozgovoy's invitation and the council failed.
Mozgovoy had strained relations with Kozitsyn, he fell out with Dryomov due to the arguments on the subject of abandoning the Lisichansk wedge.


The front line before the militia retreated from the Lisichansk wedge.

Formally, the Lisichansk wedge was abandoned by the decision of the DPR defense minister Strelkov, because holding on to it would trigger the loss of all forces located there and personally I view the decision of abandoning Lisichansk as a correct decision. Given the forces available to Mozgovoy and the configuration of the front at that time, he would end up in a pocket similar to the Debalcevo pocket. Even though the front line still held near Pervomaisky and Popasnaya, the eastern face of the Lisichansk wedge already started to "fold" because the LPR command didn't have sufficient forces to engage and bind the forces that the enemy threw at cutting off the Lisichansk wedge.
Back then Mozgovoy publicly lamented the lack of anti-tank weapons and armor, which was strongly reminiscent of what happened at Yampol and Slavyansk.


Translation of the text above:
The refinery was shelled again today... a large group of armor was stopped on its approaches. A tank, an IFV, and two trucks with ammunition for "Grad" vehicles were destroyed.
For the Ukrainian army these are minor losses, which they won't even mention. As for us, we lost more people today than ever... The fighters didn't retreat from their FA a single step! They stood to the last, but didn't let the tank column through. With the weapons we have... they could only perish. Only three out of ten RPGs worked!!! We don't have anything else to oppose the tanks! Where are the columns that roll into Lugansk and Donetsk??? Where's that artillery about which they write in the Internet so merrily??? Where are the tanks that fill the pages of the internet communities??? Where's all that? Whose asses are protected by all that materiel???
Today I lost almost a whole platoon... the guys were simply rolled over by tanks. They didn't even let us collect the bodies, as for the WIAs – they were finished off by the national guardsmen. After this I am myself half-dead  But I swear! If I remain alive, I'll make everyone who promote himself on this war and build their political future sufer! I'll make those who make money on the lives of the people who die for truth suffer!!!

MOZGOVOY ALEKSEY


However, Dryomov thought that Mozgovoy is to blame for abandoning Lisichansk. These accusations most had to do with the fact that a commandant company was left in Lisichansk, which continued to offer resistance already after the retreat (some of the personnel perished, others managed to get through to their own). The reasons for leaving this company are still quite murky some believe that they forgot to warn them, others that they became victims to the secrecy of the retreat and that for some reasons they were not informed of the command plans. Still others state that the company was consciously left in the rear guard (that is, it was effectively sacrificed) in order to cover the retreat of the main forces, which became inevitable after abandoning Severodonetsk.


A promised, but never happened, Bolotov's counter-offensive became one of the last steps taken by the first LPR leader as the Republic's head.

The promised counter-offensive by Bolotov, which was supposed to use the armor accumulated due to the "South Cauldron" and the "voentorg" shipments remained a propaganda phantom. The accumulated reserves were properly used only in August, during the decisive fighting in the area of Krasnyi Luch, Lutugino, Khryashevatoye, and Novosvetlovka, when Bolotov was already removed.



Pavel Dryomov, the commander of Platov Cossack regiment, is now holding a front line segment near Bakhmutka.

In the end, the situation when the forces were saved but people were abandoned created certain tensions between Dryomov and Mozgovoy, which impeded their cooperation, although with respect to criticizing the Minsk truce and the current LPR leadership they were in essence united.


Strelkov and Mozgovoy. Moscow, September 2014. During the summer of 2014 their forces suffered the heaviest blows of the enemy.

2. A public rapprochement with Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn (who acted completely autonomously and even promoted his subordinates to the generals of the Cossack National Guard) followed in October, when the sides under the pressure from Moscow formally agreed to cooperate. This was an awkward union, because not a single of the leaders who formed it could claim the entirety of the LPR authority for objective reasons and this temporary triumvirate became a compromise of sorts between the most influential figures in the LPR at that moment. Among all three, Mozgovoy was the weakest in the military respect. Plotnitsky received reinforcements through "voentorg" and Kozitsyn only recently got inflated by the trophies from the "South Cauldron" and the mini-cauldrons that followed routing the junta groups near Lutugino, the Lugansk airport, and Khryashevatoye.


Elections of the LPR head.

3. However, already in November, after Plotnitsky got legitimized through elections as the head of the republic and started to gradually collect power, the conflicts in the LPR flared up with new intensity. Besides Kozitsyn and Mozgovoy, a number of other commanders ended up opposing Plotnitsky – Dryomov, Bednov, Ishenko, Fominov, the former Minister of the Defense of the LPR Bugrov. Later they were even accused of conspiracy http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/67915.html (in Russian) with the goal of deposing Plotnitsky.
The fate of this opposition varied:

1. Kozitsyn – is in Russia, a significant part of his people transferred under the command of the centralized LPR authority.
2. Dryomov – became a part of the armed forces of the republic, received a banner from Plotnitsky, although there is light criticism coming from him at times.
3. Bednov – executed by "our side".
4. Fominov – officially arrested, his whereabouts are unknown (most likely he is sitting at the basement of the Ministry for State Security or of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the LPR).
5. Bugrov – arrested in Russia, officially for some financial machinations (smuggling of pipes) associated with Rottenberg's firm.
6. Ishenko – executed, it is not exactly clear by whom.
7. Mozgovoy – executed, it is not exactly clear by whom.


Compromising material on Kozitsyn, which was spread in the face of the compromising material on Plotnitsky. Effectively, the sides argued about which of them sold more coal to the junta, while other "businessmen" sold it semi-legally or illegally.


A punishment by whipping in Antratsit.

4. Blood was shed in the end of November http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1921560.html (in Russian). Unable to negotiate about who will control the legal and the semi-legal shipments of coal to the junta, bloody feuds started between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn, which involved Antratsit (it became a symbol of Cossack arbitrariness of sorts), Krasnyi Luch, Krasnodon, and a number of other settlements. These feuds, which resembled a criminal hello from the 90s, killed several tens of people on both sides. This includes the leadership of Antratsit, which was locked on Kozitsyn. Meanwhile, both sides eagerly uploaded dirt on each other on the internet, which had to do with coal trading  http://novosteman.ru/ataman-kozicyn-o-prodazhe-uglya-o-plotnickom-i-o-mirnyh-peregovorah (in Russian).
A conflict with Dryomov continued in the meantime, who threatened to publicize the contents of a flash drive with dirt on Plotnitsky and impeded trading coal through subordinate territory. Meanwhile, he had been orally insulting the LPR MPs. Due to the approximate equivalence of forces, the arguments couldn't be resolved by force and the conflict stretched until the spring of 2015.

5. Alexander Bednov is killed in early January. LPR leadership takes responsibility.


The Lutugino turn. The location of the death of Alexander Bednov and of the fighters of the "Batman" RRG (some of them were RF citizens).

http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1971455.html – the murder of Bednov. Part No. 1
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1972398.html – the murder of Bednov. Part No. 2
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1974903.html – the murder of Bednov. Part No. 3

Meanwhile, the campaign on discrediting one of the most famous field commanders of Novorossia is unfolding. The last name of the "vacationeer" Vagner is brought up during the scandal as well as various political details of feuding in Lugansk, which also made Bednov's murder purely political, despite the attempts to present his case as being purely criminal. A clear result was the vote on the "Russian Spring", where Bednov became one of the five  http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1981016.html (in Russian) most popular heroes of Novorossia of 2014. This murder, and the subsequent informational campaign for discrediting Bednov seriously discredited the LPR leadership. I'll get back to this question somewhat later.


The commander of SBrSD (Separate Brigade of Special Designation) "Odessa" and the "Ghost" brigade commander Mozgovoy.

6. A number of autonomous units are subsequently disarmed, which includes SBrSD "Odessa" of Fominov http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1980728.html (in Russian). Fominov accused Plotnitsky of selling Russian humanitarian aid through the network of "Narodny" supermarkets. He had no photos, but he had documents + video of opening one of the warehouses, which was uploaded by his people on the internet.











This was presented as "showdowns between the gangs of Plotnitsky and Fominov" by the Ukrainian media. Naturally, all of the feuds between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn and Plotnitsky and Fominov were simply a boon for the Ukrainian propaganda. We'll look at why this happened in more detail.

On January 10th, after disarming "Odessa" (which was used among other things for the attempts of pressuring Mozgovoy) and arresting Fominov, the weapons and humanitarian aid were evacuated from the "Odessa" base in 5 KAMAZ trucks. The subsequent fate of Fominov is quite murky. Among the accusations directed at him that I heard: expropriating the humanitarian aid and the refusal to report to joint military structures. How much truth is there in these accusations – I don't want to judge, I didn't see the facts. The only thing I'd note is that Fominov wasn't murdered, even though his people put up the largest amount of compromising material on the internet. Somewhat less was uploaded by Kozitsyn's and Dryomov's people. Mozgovoy and Ischenko limited themselves to generic statements. Nevertheless, the much less famous Fominov wasn't executed, but rather was captured and placed in a basement.
A substantial consequence of the hassle raised by Fominov and his people became a visit by the RF commission into Lugansk on the subject of checking the accusations about stealing humanitarian shipments from the "white convoys". In April some even thought that there will be consequences – Plotnitsky stayed in the RF for a time and there were rumors of him being replaced due to the accumulated negative evidence (Bolotov suddenly reappeared in the media field), but later Plotnitsky returned and continued to work as the head of the republic. Whether this story will have further consequences remains unknown.


Yevgeny Ischenko with his spouse.

7. Yevgeny Ischenko was murdered on January 23rd near Pervomaisk http://voicesevas.ru/news/yugo-vostok/9070-pogib-mer-pervomayska-evgeniy-ischenko-video.html (in Russian), who held Dryomov's positions during the acute conflict between Dryomov and Plotnitsky and accused Plotnitsky of stealing humanitarian aid and brokering a cease-fire with the junta https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5NFs-8xYa0 (in Russian). But already on January 1st of 2015 Ischenko publicly stated that he has no further issues with Plotnitsky https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRN63KhT6kE (in Russian). Dryomov and Mozgovoy spoke in similar words. Who killed Ischenko – the junta SRG or, like in the case of Bednov, "our side" — is not known. In any case there is a clear connection between the emergence of the information about the participation of the "vacationeers" in the liquidation of Bednov and the backing down and reducing the intensity of the criticism by the famous field commanders. That is why it is hard to say why Ischenko had to be killed, if he publicly spoke of his loyalty and there are no facts of him plotting against Plotnitsky. The murder of Ischenko and the Russian volunteers who died with him simply faded on the background of the unfolding battle for the Donetsk airport and Debalcevo.


Ataman Kozitsyn, the leader of the "Cossack National Guard", up until recently he controlled about a half of the LPR.

8. In March, after the end of the battle for Debalcevo, the active phase of the internal conflict within LPR between the cossacks and the leadership of the LPR reignited http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2071189.html, when ataman Kozitsyn returned into Novorossia on February 18-19. The FSB held Kozitsyn at the border, because there was a "hold" placed on his entry into the territory of the Novorossia, but after some unclear convulsions in Moscow Kozitsyn got the "green light" and, unexpectedly for many, showed up in Novorossia again, even though it was thought that, like Strelkov, Bolotov, and Bezler, he won't return again.


Ataman "Kosogor", who controlled Krasnyi Luch.


Ataman "Magadan", controlled Petrovskoye. Recently he was let go, joined the territorial militia.

In the end all of this led to the continuation of arrests and bloody showdowns. The famous atamans "Kosogor" http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2073700.html, "Magadan" and so on and so forth were arrested.
Some were later released due to the lack of crimes http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2187078.html (in Russian) and now they joined the LPR military structures, some are still imprisoned ("Kosogor" on charges of abusing local population and hostage-taking). Armor, and even whole howitzer batteries were withheld from the units that were declared to be organized crime groups. In early April there was an ultimatum for Kozitsyn – either he joins the military structures of the LPR or he goes. In the end Kozitsyn was again squeezed out of the LPR and he is now in Russia and a significant part of his former domain transferred under the control of the LPR, although there is no speaking about a final resolution to the conflict. It is just that the part of the bloody struggle for the coal money (in which, according to Dryomov, some of the supervisors were involved  http://my.mail.ru/mail/val20101/video/393/30126.html (in Russian) and also certain supervisors who were solving their private issues associated with personal enrichment under the banner of building the LPR) fell from the level of standoff between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn into shadows.

The former minister of defense of the LPR Bugrov.

8. Bugrov http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2119290.html (in Russian) was arrested in Saint-Petersburg on April 1st, who already had no significant influence over the processes in the LPR. The circumstances of his arrest are quite murky, so here we can guess whether this arrest had to do with the political struggle in the LPR or if it was just a coincidence. Little is actually known about Bugrov, he wasn't very popular even when he was in power. During the autumn of 2014 he stood for wide entry of Kozitsyn's cossacks into power. It is hard to say if he had common interests with Kozitsyn or not.

By the time of Mozgovoy's murder the opposition for Plotnitsky was already quite hollow, because the most significant figures already either joined the LPR or were removed in one way or another. Due to the understanding the fact that Plotnitsky is just a high-ranking executive and that opposition to him implies a conflict with his supervisors even Dryomov tempered his pride and Kozitsyn was forced to yield. Regarding the killings, as of today we can speak with 100% confidence only about "Batman" killing, who was eliminated precisely for his political opposition (either on the behalf of the people from the LPR leadership or on the behalf of the LPR supervisors). There's no such confidence about Ischenko. As well as, actually, about Bugrov's arrest.


One of the samples of the oeuvre by Kurginyan's sectarians, who continued to strike various Novorussian commanders during the whole year – Strelkov, Mozgovoy, Petrovsky, Bezler, and meanwhile promoted Khodakovsky.

Since the autumn of 2014 there was an informational campaign on discrediting Mozgovoy http://777hawk.livejournal.com/490731.html (in Russian), where Kurginyan's sect was cooperating with the junta media and the "redsofa unitary-Ukrainiantards", who formed a united front in the business of discrediting the brigade commander. Meanwhile, the official LPR authorities had a more restrained public posture towards the conflict with Mozgovoy and when the question of disbanding the brigade stood up in the winter, they refuted these rumors together with Mozgovoy, which allowed Mozgovoy to say back then that "Ghost" will be preserved through the process of "brigadization".
In essence, the conflict ended up being frozen. Mozgovoy continued to occasionally scold the Lugansk government, but after Bednov killing he did this quite vaguely.


Mozgovoy at the front near Debalcevo.

After the start of the battle for Debalcevo, Mozgovoy's brigade received a supply line on the level of the units of the People's militia of the LPR and took part in the offensive on the north-eastern face of the Debalcevo wedge. The offensive developed with intermediate success and was associated with significant losses due to the mistakes by the commands and the growing pains of the LPR army. At a certain stage Mozgovoy refused to attack in order to not waste his people in useless head-on attacks. Later they tried to blame him for this, alleging that he disrupted the plans of the offensive on Debalcevo from the north-east. Actually, the head-on attacks choked not only on the location of Mozgovoy's advance and of his flank neighbors. The offensive got stuck on the majority of the front, similarly to e.g. how the offensive at Nikishino stopped, how the offensive on Krymskoye choked, and to how our forces were repelled from Troitskoye. The accusations of the brigade avoiding active participation in the offensive the brigade reasonably answered with the fact that it was exactly the "Ghost" fighters who saved the "August" battalion fighters (the commander was removed) after heavy losses.


The front line at Debalcevo on the eve of the decisive attack by "Olkhon" and the GRU DPR to Logvinovo.

The success  http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2074422.html (in Russian) was achieved mostly due to the efforts of the DPR army (and even there not by the forces of the newly formed brigades but by the joint group made of the veterans of various units), which managed to penetrate the enemy front line near Uglegorsk and which led to the cauldron. During subsequent proceedings they tried to turn Mozgovoy into a scapegoat, but the fact of replacing "Tambov" was much more illuminating. This topic is discussed in more detail in the well-known discussion on Debalcevo.

http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2106302.html (in Russian) – How Debalcevo was captured. Part No. 1
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2106439.html (in Russian) – How Debalcevo was captured. Part No. 2
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2107130.html (in Russian) – How Debalcevo was captured. Addendum


Dryomov gets the banner from Plotnitsky.

By May, Mozgovoy kept his brigade but it became much smaller. The limitations of supply, internal conflicts, losses, and the war-weariness seriously reduced the headcount of the brigade. A part of it joined the official military structures of the LPR as a battalion of the territorial defense, similarly to a part of ataman Kozitsyn forces. Nevertheless, unlike Dryomov, Mozgovoy refused to receive the unit banner from Plotnitsky's hands and remained in an intermediate position of sorts, when on the one side his unit was a part of the LPR military structure, and on the other side there was no full-fledged political integration in the LPR due to the political views of Mozgovoy and his attitude towards the LPR leadership. Here we are not speaking of the military questions, because it is not Plotnitsky who is in charge of the war on the LPR territory but rather the people like Tambov, who led the both the units of the People's Militia of the LPR and the territorial units and the semi-autonomous units of Kozitsyn and Mozgovoy during the winter campaign. So, the conflict had more of a political and ideological nature rather than military one.



Already in May the conflict flared up again when Mozgovoy was forbidden to hold a military parade in Alchevsk, after which he ignored the ban and held an international conference in Alchevsk http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2190230.html (in Russian). Precisely due to this conference the question of systemic political disagreements stood up again. Having received support from the MFA of the LPR and a number of ministries (which suggest serious internal tensions within the leadership of the LPR), Mozgovoy was opposed by certain LPR officials, who tried to disrupt the conference. On May 8th, according to Mozgovoy, certain unannounced by him people who were associated with the LPR leadership direct threatened him with his arrest and murder.

«Within half-an-hour there were two "generous" offers — the arrest and the utter elimination... In the case I won't refuse to hold a military parade in Alchevsk and to hold the absolutely necessary as of today event for Novorossia — the forum of solidarity between the people of Novorossia and Europe»
«There is a dictatorship. But not a military and not of the proletariat. A dictatorship of choreographers from the previous times... And let the AFU representatives be jubilant, because their picture is the same. A year ago many of you sincerely believed in the disintegration of the oligarchic regime and in the return of the dignity to the people. In the end, one set of thieves was replaced by another set of thieves — more bloodthirsty, effectively the same analogy can be drawn in our territory as well. All of those who arose here — arose for justice and the supremacy of the PEOPLE! In the end both sides got the same thing — murder. A murder of their own," — Mozgovoy laments.
«After today's argument with certain people, there will be no victory day parade in Alchevsk – not because I pitied myself... there are many innocent people around me. And each spared life is the best reward. I offer my apologies to everyone who expected this parade»


http://www.politnavigator.net/kombrig-mozgovojj-zayavil-o-diktature-v-lnr-i-otmenil-parad-v-alchevske.html (in Russian) – link

Effectively, Mozgovoy accused the LPR leadership of presence a certain group of people (we'll get back to this), which he distinguished from the overall leadership, who threatened his murder. I remind you that after Bednov's murder the representative of the LPR counter-intelligence spoke in similar terms, suggesting that some unannounced group is framing Plotnitsky as the main to blame. Besides, Mozgovoy released two position articles — "The System" http://mozgovoy.info/main/text/360-sistema.html (in Russian) and "The System-2" http://novosteman.ru/aleksey-mozgovoy-sistema-2 (in Russian), which were an unambiguous critique of the current LPR leadership and were effectively an answer to the offers of not holding the conference.

When the murder followed (for now we won't touch the topic of who exactly was the murderer), naturally the LPR leadership became the prime suspect, given such a background, because there were both serious disagreements and the public threats directed at Mozgovoy and also one confirmed fact of eliminating a disagreeable field commander (which certain lame propagandists interpreted as a step in the right direction, not thinking in their lameness of the consequences for the LPR). On the one side there is a clear scheme: Mozgovoy had an open conflict with Plotnitsky (or with some people who stand above Plotnitsky / pursue their goals independently from Plotnitsky) and after the sounded threats he was stupidly and talentlessly murdered, to make an example for others. Furthermore, after the murder of Bednov, many critics of the LPR leadership openly declared that Mozgovoy will be also killed.
Simplistically, this looks like the following picture, which is spread on social networks.


Translation: Here's who is the real Hero of Ukraine!

But is everything so straightforward?

To be continued. In the second part we will look at the Ukrainian trace and at the conspiracy theory associated with the "third power" and certain questions of the "hybrid war", after which there will be a summary.

Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2198800.html (in Russian)



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