Colonel Cassad (in English)

Bullhorn of Totalitarian Propaganda

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On the situation in Donbass by August 31
NKVD Officer
cassad_eng


A review of the situation in Donbass by August 31


LPR

1. The situation on the northern front in the LPR is stable. The militia offensive here is developing fair to middling; though there are no significant successes on the northern front here, there are tactical successes. However, the junta still holds part of Stanitsa Luganskaya and impedes conducting operations for encircling the forces located to the north of Lugansk.

2. During fighting for Lutugino the militia fighters were able to establish control over a part of this settlement. Even though they announced that they took the whole town, in reality the junta continues to cling to it and it is too early to speak about taking full control of Lutugino. Fighting continues there now. Our side is pressing but the junta is resisting stubbornly because the consequences of giving up Lutugino will have operational significance: the transport connectedness of Novorossia will increase, which, coupled with the likely loss of Debalcevo during the next week, will facilitate carrying out offensive operations by the army of Novorossia over internal communication lines.

3. The junta was finally pushed away from Novosvetlovka and thus they finally eliminated the consequences of  the junta forces breakthrough to the roadway Lugansk-Krasnodon. It didn't take the militia 2 days as a they were boasting right after the breakthrough, instead it took more than a week. But the important thing is that the result was achieved and now the question with the cargo for Lugansk will be a bit easier to deal with.

4. The questions about Ataman Kozitsyn and several other LPR field commanders, who do not obey anyone whatsoever, are now posed quite seriously. The headquarters in Krasnodon are serious about doing away with the lack of unity of command and Makhnovism in the observable future. Actually, a significant problem of the LPR is that the local militia is turning into an army much slower than in the DPR, plus some of the commanders are concerned with things that are quite different from things they should be concerned with besides the war. From this comes the sluggish scramble against the airport and the headbutting on the northern front. The problem here is not even in the junta's strength, but rather in the organizational weakness of the LPR militia, which still needs a lot of work. According to my sources, such work on reconstructing the LPR militia into a full-fledged army is planned. Will it be effective? Hopefully, it will.

5. On the one hand, the regime on the border became more stringent, but on the other hand it became more transparent, the degree of outright criminal activity and lawlessness decreased somewhat. The delivery of autumn-winter clothing started, a partial fulfillment of the militia needs of warm uniforms is expected by the end of the month. I also clarified the questions on the nomenclature of the goods that are necessary for the fighting militia: they asked to give higher priority to professional radio stations with encryption ability, radio stations for coordinating militia squads, drones, night vision goggles, IR imagers, and tactical vests. One of these days I will lay out a more detailed list of the nomenclature of what's necessary according to the requests of military structures of Novorossia.

DPR

1. At the front that stretched from Avdeyevka to Debalcevo, the general situation didn't change much, a positional front formed here, where the parties are not able to achieve decisive results yet, although the militia are working to strengthen the positions that support the corridor to semi-encircled Gorlovka, also they try wrap Debalcevo tighter. As before, the two sides are actively firing at each other's positions, plus the junta continues its terrorist shelling of Donetsk. Many people ask why is Donetsk still getting shelled if our side is on the offensive on the south. In fact, only after taking Debalcevo, Avdeyevvka, Mar'inka and Karlovka, and also after pushing the junta out of the Donetsk airport would it become feasible to eliminate the potential ability to continue systematic shelling of Donetsk. In the meantime, while the northern front is stable, shelling will continue. According to our estimates, another 1.5-2 weeks are necessary, after which some residents may attempt to return into the DPR capital.

2. South of Kurakhovo the junta is now hastily trying to restore the front that was cut by the militia offensive. There's not a single front line as such, there are screens and several armored groups,with which the junta is trying to attack the outer ring of the encirclement of troops that sit in the cauldron to the west of Starobeshevo. Because almost all militia forces are bound by the blockade of the cauldrons, the activity is mainly exhibited by sabotage/reconnaissance groups (SRG), which act in the junta rear while the main forces are concentrated on the outer ring of the encirclement. In this case, if we speak about the situation on the outer ring of the encirclement, then both sides don't have sufficient forces for offensive operations.

3. The cauldron under Dyakovo is not eliminated up until this point. Apparently, the militia here transitioned to a typical blockade of the encircled troops, who were offered the typical conditions of surrender, including exit through the Russian border. To speed up their train of thought, the encircled troops are periodically shelled, but not too much - the main forces of the artillery and the MRLS are pulled into other locations.

4. On the one hand, the Amvrosiyevka cauldron continues to please with big losses of the junta in personnel and materiel, the punitive battalion "Donbass-1", judging by Semenchenko's temper tantrum, suffered its 4th defeat since the beginning of the war.
The process of "humanitarian corridor" began today, where a part of the junta's troops were effectively let out of the cauldron in exchange for the release of "Russian paratroopers" and for some compromises that are not named. In the coming days we will learn if it will be trophies, weapons, or some political commitments. It must be understood that, in parallel with the war, there are active consultations going on, where they are trying to work out the terms of the bargain that will define the borders between Novorossia (which obviously will be a state that is independent of Ukraine) and the remains of Ukraine. The rout under Ilovaysk and Amvrosiyevka in general eliminated the threat for Donetsk from the south. Whatever will be allowed to exit can only  be the remains of battered units with low morale.
The militia are looking forward to restarting the offensive towards Dnieper, but I think they weren't very enthusiastic about Moscow's decision. But in this case the political expediency prevailed over the military one. Just so that you can understand the price of this deal: http://russian.rt.com/article/47755 (in Russian)

5. The DPR militia offensive continues on the south near Azov sea. After taking Novoazovsk the militia are avoiding a frontal assault of Mariupol and wrap it with their SRG instead, intercepting the roadway to Berdyansk, sweeping the minor checkpoints, and capturing unprotected settlements. Interception of a part of the roads to the west of Mariupol created not only a threat of the operational encirclement of the city (which can be supplied by the sea), but it also created a distant threat for Berdyansk, in which there are not so many forces.
But it should be understood that only small SRG groups operate to the west of Mariupol and inside the borders of the Zaporozhye region, they have the most favorable conditions due to the absence of a coherent front of the enemy, which clings to major settlements. In the coming days armor and artillery will start to advance from Novoazovsk - it will either go directly to Mariupol, or more likely it will begin to bypass it, approaching the borders of the Zaporozhye region and moving towards Berdyansk. Given the accumulation of a sufficient force, the militia can develop an attack on Mariupol or it can choose a more ambitious plan with a strike on Berdyansk and unfolding full-scale military action on the territory of the Zaporozhye region with the goal of taking the capital of the ZPR (Zaporozhye People's Republic) to which Kolomoisky is clinging.

Overall, the militia continues to take advantage of the consequences of the rout of the southern front of the junta, it will allow to liberate sufficiently large territories and to start military action outside the DPR, which is politically significant. At the same time, we can see how backstage political processes begin to influence the situation at the front, as if hinting that eventually everything will be resolved through negotiations.
Nevertheless, there is confirmed information that a major offensive of the militia with ambitious goals will start next week. I look forward to the implementation of this plan. It should be pleasant for many of us.

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