Blog Information

If you want to help Novorossia, then please refer to the English version of the "Voice of Sevastopol" website, which can be visited using the clickable image to the right below the tag bar. Then, go to the "Humanitarian Section" in the menu.

This blog is a faithful English translation of colonelcassad – the awesome Russian blog about the war in Ukraine. This translation is an independent effort and is not affiliated with any of the resources of colonelcassad.

The translations are posted actively here when the military or political situation in Ukraine is undergoing rapid change -- i.e., there is an ongoing military or political crisis. During the periods of relative calm this blog is in a "hibernation mode" of sorts. The maintainer of the blog has limited resources and so the daily updates are performed only during the periods of crisis. Essentially, the translations are posted at the intensity of the conflict. If you would like to see more translations and more frequent updates, consider contributing your own translations to cassad-eng (please send the translations to me by email at unclemartin-AT-mail-DOT-ru to if you want your them to appear on cassad-eng very quickly). Otherwise, you may refer to the English mirror of the Voice of Sevastopol, machine translations of colonelcassad, or to the links on the right sidebar.
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NKVD Officer

Murder of Mozgovoy – by whom and for what? Part no. 2

We continue to review versions of the murder of Aleksey Mozgovoy. In the first part (in Russian) the versions of the criminal trace and the LPR feuds were considered. Below we will consider the version of the Ukrainian trace and of the "third party".Collapse )
NKVD Officer

Murder of Mozgovoy – by whom and for what? Part no. 1

Over Yesterday I collected a number of facts on this murder here: (in Russian)
My personal view of Aleksey Mozgovoy was described here:

Now let's look at the proposed versions.
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NKVD Officer

There is no speaking of inclusion of Novorossia into Ukraine any longer

In the journal of general Kanchukov I found an interview of the former SVR general Reshetnikov, who now leads the RISR analytical center.

On the northern outskirts of Moscow, under reliable protection of the interior troops the formerly secret institute of the Foreign Intelligence Service is hidden. The golden letters "Russian Institute of Strategic Research" now show up on the front of the overhang. But the peaceful name doesn't confuse those who are in the know — more than two hundred employees forge the Motherland's analytical shield here. Will there be a new war in the south-east of Ukraine? Who is behind the US president? Why so many among our officials can be called the ideological agents of influence? These and other questions of "AN" were answered by the director of RISR, the retired lieutenant-general Leonid RESHETNIKOV.
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NKVD Officer

Being true to OUN-UPA traditions

The Chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service Valentin Nalivaichenko believes that the SBU should be reformed by using the security service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Ukrainian Insurgent Army as an example.

“There is no need to come up with anything unnecessary—it’s important to use as foundation the traditions of and methods used by the OUN-UPA Security Service between 1930 and 1950. It operated against the aggressor under conditions of temporary territorial occupation, it had patriotic upbringing, combat counter-intelligence, and it relied on the peaceful Ukrainian population, whose unprecedented support it enjoyed,” Nalivaichenko said.
According to the SBU chairman, when reforming the agency we should reject not only “KGB designations, but also organizational structures of a security service that is alien to us.”
“For example, instead of directorates and departments, we should have districts and task forces. Task forces, unlike departments, would have broader functions, including both information war against the enemy, but also community relations,” Nalivaichenko remarked.

Nalivaichenko believes that task forces ought to operate more decisively, and “counteract any signs of separatism or aiding the aggressor in business or in any other aspect of civic life.” (in Russian) - link

P.S. Considering that OUN-UPA carried out mass killings of Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, and Jews, using it as a point of reference for the Kiev junta repressive apparatus is noteworthy. It is perfectly normal within the fascist regime in Ukraine for the president to wear the label “Cynical Banderite,” and for the SBU head to openly say that one should rely on the experience of Nazi-collaborating organizations which were party to war crimes and crimes against humanity. We have noted earlier that the Junta leadership plans include reformatting the SBU to increase its powers and to transform it into a pure political police, while ridding it of “unnecessary” functions that will be transferred to other agencies.
Keeping in mind the tasks facing SBU and the US intelligence infrastructure implanted into the formerly Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU’s transformation into political police is unavoidable, since in the event of the conflict becoming prolonged the repressive apparatus will play an even greater role due to the population’s disappointment in government policies, not to mention separatist and pro-Russian sentiments which the reformed SBU will suppress to the best of its abilities.

Original article:

This translation was contributed to this blog by one of the readers.

NKVD Officer

The Verkhovnaya Rada wants to have an election in Crimea

Translation of the tweet shown below:
Olexandr Mikhelson
March 18, 10:00pm

When Crimea will ask to be accepted back into Ukraine (like, actually, it was in 1954 - due to hunger), the Ukrainians won't celebrate this. Instead, they will roll up their sleeves and will start to repair everything that was broken by Moscow.

Like, actually, it was in 1954.

It turns out that the junta wants to conduct its own elections in Crimea. However, the probability of them actually happening on the territory of Crimea is equal to zero, but they may try to create precincts somewhere in Kherson or Genichesk for fugitive Tartar radicals and the "westerniaks" who left Crimea during the spring of 2014.
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NKVD Officer

The night of cynical banderas

After the defeat of Kolomoisky in the intra-oligarchical feud became obvious, Poroshenko didn't waste any time to launch the processes of further centralization of power. The "special operation" was announced following the fact of the murder of the SBU employee by Kolomoisky's bandits. Also, the EMERCOM minister was arrested right during the session of the cabinet of ministers on the charges of participation in the criminal schemes for fuel purchases.
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NKVD Officer

A revolt that didn't happen

Several theses about the consequences of Kolomoisky's defeat.

1. The resignation of Kolomoisky from the position of the governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region implies that there will be a reconfiguration of the political and economical field of the South-Eastern Ukraine. The chief jew-banderovite will be replaced by Rezhnichenko, who is a person from Poroshenko's deck. Previously, he was given the Zaporozhye region to be his feeding ground. Some mistakenly believed that the reason of the conflict lies in the energy assets. However, the real reason is primarily the establishment of political control over the regions of the south-east, which where Kolomoisky previously reigned unchallenged. The permission from Washington was obtained for this process, which predetermined the rapid capitulation of Kolomoisky. This whole story shows how, by a single motion from Washington, can the intra-Ukrainian political alignment change and how far a regular Ukrainian is far from determining his fate and how little power even the bloodsuckers from the junta leadership actually wield over it.

2. Some mistakenly believe that Kolomoisky has some kind of clever plan, that he'll go now and then he'll emerge and... and then he'll do something.
In the reality he will do nothing, after his resignation and Korban's resignation (he also left today), Kolomoisky lost the abilities that he obtained by integrating into the government bureaucracy. If before the governors whom he appointed in the South-East went to bow before Kolomoisky in Dnepropetrovsk, now they'll go to bow before Poroshenko in Kiev. The appointee of the head of Poroshenko's administration now sits in the domain of the former master of the South-East. Palitsa in Odessa rushed to remove the visiting bandits from the city even before the resignation of Kolomoisky, which of course didn't save the city from yet another showdown. On this background, quite concrete threats directed at Kolomoisky were sounded, which were much more substantial than his weak attempts of collecting signatures for the resignation of Nalivaychenko or of threatening with a maidan. Actually, the essence of these threats is simple: Kolomoisky, having relinquished his political power, must also relinquish his repression power by releasing the punitive troops who obey him and locking them onto the centralized structures of the SBU and the MIA. The bandit nature of these units won't change, but they must now report not to Kolomoisky but to Avakov, Nalivaychenko, and Poroshenko. Correspondingly, if this scheme will be implemented (and I believe that it will be implemented), then Kolomoisky will become just a rich and influential person, but also somebody who has no ability of opposing Poroshenko in matters of policy of force.

3. Whether Kolomoisky will be able to keep "his precious" in the state assets will depend on the terms of his capitulation. A scenario in which Kolomoisky may be allowed to keep the control over "Ukrnafta" in exchange for obedience the transfer of punitive troops to the different owners without too much hassle. However, considering the peculiarities of the Ukrainian politics, they'll probably try to utterly fleece Kolomoisky, taking revenge for all of his previous misdeeds. Thankfully, Kolomoisky made plenty of enemies in Ukraine. The "Privat" group itself is unlikely to be dismembered, because this may trigger the collapse of the already weakened "Privat-Bank". However, its influence will likely be maximally restricted, with the intent of turning Kolomoisky into yet another "unpretentious oligarch". Naturally, Kolomoisky will resist where he can in order to not permit the full collapse of his empire, but these will be precisely the rearguard skirmishes, when the main battle is already lost.

4. This story will obviously strengthen Poroshenko's power, but to a limited degree, because Avakov, Yatsenyuk, and Nalivaychenko are at this moment only situational allies of Poroshenko in his fight with Kolomoisky. Also, the emergence if these allies was secured not by the influence of Poroshenko himself, but rather by the "goodwill" of Washington, which made a clear bet on Poroshenko and which suggested to Kolomoisky that he shouldn't cross the true owners of the Ukraine. Hence the absence of revolts, maidans, and marches on Kiev, because this would imply taking a stand directly against Washington. This would be funny, considering the fact that Kolomoisky's assets are located in the West. Kolomoisky is certainly a thug, but he is not a moron. So it was easier to lose power than it was to lose everything. Therefore, despite all of their noisy threats against Kiev, Kolomoisky and Korban casually surrendered their power today.

5. Strengthening of the central authority in Kiev will mean that the controllability of the processes in the South-East will increase because instead of the headstrong Kolomoisky and his appointees there will be mostly obedient Gauleiters sitting there, who will implement the general line of the Kiev junta. It is also guaranteed that the portion of grey business associated with the trade through the front line will now belong to the new masters of regions (this primarily has to do with semi-legal and illegal schemes of coal trading). The punitive battalions will be forced to report to the centralized structures — either the MIA or the SBU (the "Right Sector" militants will likely remain under Nalivaychenko, naturally nobody is going to let Yarosh in the General Staff now) with a more realistic operational control by sector commands. Also it is worth expecting the decrease of pressure on the General Staff and Muzhenko, because the informational attack on them was sponsored by Kolomoisky. Besides this, after the fall of Kolomoisky the traditional outflow of his former associates to the winning camp will start. Naturally, Kolomoisky, unless he will be fully destroyed, will keep a part of his political clutter in the form of the purchased MPs in the Verkhovnaya Rada. However, this will be more of a regular lobbyist group than an instrument for the struggle for power now. For Novorossia the fall of Kolomoisky and the centralization of the command over punitive battalions will imply that it will no longer be possible to underwrite the ongoing war on the designs of Kolomoisky and "uncontrolled battalions". "Partner Pete" is now responsible for everything. On the other side, the centralization of control in Ukraine will more likely serve the goals of internal mobilization of the junta in the face of the next stage of the war. Little has actually changed for Novorossia, just like before her future will depend on the outcome of the military standoff against the AFU.

Should we sympathize with Kolomoisky? Of course, not. Along with Turchinov and Poroshenko, Kolomoisky is one of the most bloody junta bosses, who did much for the civil war to follow its bloodiest scenario. The exasperation of the war is in many ways due to precisely the activity of Kolomoisky, which led to the Odessa Khatyn, after which all of the remaining bridges were burned. In principle, I don't abandon the hope that sooner or later justice will reach Kolomoisky, as well as other chiefs of a coup that ended with a civil war.

Original article: (in Russian)