cassad_eng (cassad_eng) wrote,

On Political Underpinnings of Strelkov's Harassment

As it is quite obvious, the campaign of harassing Mr. Strelkov that was launched yesterday did not come from nowhere and has a purely political genesis. Leaving Slavyansk, where as many expected he would perish together with his brigade, he became a so-called "wildcard", which ruined a number of the previously existing scenarios.

Actually, the political rationale of leaving Slavyansk was even more significant than the military one. If the military necessity was already discussed in detail before, then the time has come to point at the political underpinnings of Mr. Strelkov's maneuver.
After the turn of the foreign policy line of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in April 2014, virtually all decision pathways on Donbass started to pass through Mr. Surkov, and even Mr. Volodin was de-facto dismissed from supervising this question. After it became obvious that the military intervention is either delayed or is altogether off the table, the question arose on the topic of what to do with what was going on in Donbass. Because due to domestic political considerations dumping the DPR and the LPR was likely to cause internal turmoil (the risk of which is quite a lot higher than it may seem to some), an intermediate variant was chosen, where on the background of the retreat of the official diplomacy, Moscow continued to support the rebellious republics covertly (which the propagandists later passed off as the Putin's Clever Plan).

In doing so, the course was chosen towards forming Novorossia, which, according to the plans, was to be headed by Mr. Tsaryov, who, being in Moscow, started to receive funding (together with a number of other people, which would substitute him in the case of a failure) and on whom they tried to lock in the so-called people's governors of Novorossia totaling up to 7-9 people, who were for the most part virtual figures. The first attempt to implant Mr. Tsaryov into Donbass failed – Mr. Tsaryov announced Novorossia, but a number of characters like Mr. Bolotov and Mr. Borodai announced that Tsaryov can proclaim whatever he wants for himself, but the decisions are made by other people, after which the argument between them ensued with accusations of fraud thrown at the local leaders. From the second attempt, Mr. Tsaryov was finally seated into Donbass, because Moscow locked a part of funding and humanitarian aid channels on him and the local leaders were forced to trample on their pride.

After the development of the situation in Donbass started to follow a negative direction, due to the assist from the USA, who ensured the cover for the junta, the course was taken toward creating a peculiar analog of Transnistria on the territory of the DPR and the LPR based on 2 republics with a population of 7 million (the idea of Novorossia that consists of several regions became a propaganda phantom after a certain point).

They tried to negotiate the creation of this project with the USA and Kiev, but were refused, which is why the course was taken towards an agreement with Mr. Akhmetov and his people, which were offered, under assurances of power and property, to support the rebellion and take certain positions within the structures of the new state. All of these dances around nationalizing Mr. Akhmetov's property, when Mr. Pushilin first threatened to seize everything, and then Mr. Borodai appeared and said that we are no communists and won't seize anything, and then new threats – we'll seize anyway, no matter if not everything – all of this were the external echoes of the ongoing bargain with Mr. Akhmetov and his people. The surrender of Mariupol, in which Mr. Akhmetov had his finger in by blocking the coherent work on preparing the city defense, this was so to say a part of the "dialog". The story of Mr. Khodakovsky, who while already being the commander of "Vostok" continued to take money from Akhmetov and betrayed his people, was also a part of this behind-the-scenes haggling, when Akhmetov in essence was getting rid of uncontrollable militia fighters so that they wouldn't start building the DPR for real.

The problem of the DPR is essentially that Mr. Akhmetov still has significant influence on the DPR leadership and Donetsk elites. Moscow takes this moment into account and tries to (through Mr. Surkov and a number of authorized people) negotiate with him. But the junta and the USA are, of course, aware of these gestures and Mr. Akhemtov, whose financial capital is located in the West, is held by his private places much firmer. Therefore, these bargains are not bringing the liberation of the DPR and the LPR closer, even though the curators of the Ukrainian question seriously think that their plan with Mr. Akhmetov will work out.

It is precisely due to these bargains with Mr. Akmetov, who has contacts with both Moscow and Kiev, that Donetsk, being in the state of war, effectively is not subject to shelling and airstrikes (unlike, e.g., Luhansk), which suggests the existence of certain agreements with the junta on the topic of keeping Donetsk away from the real combat, which went on under Slavyansk and goes on in the territory of the LPR. The contacts, of course, are carried out through Mr. Akhmetov's representatives, who are accepted in both Kiev cabinets and in the cabinets of the DPR leadership.

Meanwhile, the work on creating a joint military command was sabotaged for 3 months in Donetsk, the fact of the existence of the authorities that report to Kiev was ignored, the nation building is flushed down the toilet, the militia squads are fragmented, weakly organized, and incapable of solving tasks of the offensive nature – the fact that over May-June the groups for striking at the external encirclement ring in Slavyansk weren't organized is the best evidence of the unwillingness of a number of people to wage war for real.
In Donetsk the following thrived: looting, banditism, murder, protection rackets, the murder of Mr. Pushilin's aide, an attempt on Mr. Gubarev's life, the militia are screwing around near the airport for more than a month, no serious force for capturing the tank warehouse in Artyomovsk was deployed, even though nothing prevented them from moving the available tanks and IFVs from Donetsk into Artyomovsk, add 2-3 militia companies to them and finally take the desired base. This moment was also torpedoed from Donetsk.
By the time of the end of the truce, the situation that formed in Donetsk was close to the dump of the DPR, the city effectively avoiding war, and the local politicians tried to negotiate with both Moscow and Kiev, where the DPR itself was in essence a bargaining chip, actually as well as the population of the DPR, which became hostages of this bargain.
Mr. Strelkov in Slavyansk was supposed to perish beautifully, away from this political shit.

But in July, when it became clear that the "truce" was used to concentrate the junta's forces in Donbass, the defeatist party started to gain strength in Donetsk, which, while not stopping the negotiations with the Kremlin representatives, effectively started to prepare the city for surrender through Mr. Akhmetov's people. They didn't need war and they didn't need Mr. Strelkov even more – therefore as the junta was cutting off supply lines for Slavyansk, until he was hanging on Nikolayevka alone – nobody wasn't even thinking about piercing a robust corridor to him. The military intervention from the Russian Federation was not expected (and Slavyansk was, in essence, held just for it, as an important communications hub), neither was the blockade-lifting strike. By the evening of July 2nd Mr. Strelkov understood that, although judging from his announcements, the understanding of being prepared for slaughter emerged in him somewhat earlier. Plus, the information about the growing treachery in Donetsk was obtained.

When the rapid breakthrough of Mr. Strelkov into Donetsk occurred, it caused a minor shock at first, and then panic – Mr. Strelkov gathered the garrisons of the abandoned cities and came into Donetsk, in order to create a fortified district out of it and conduct active defense relying on Donetsk and Gorlovka. That is, he ruined the plans of peacefully surrendering Donetsk to the junta. From here comes Mr. Akhmetov's aggravated crying of "don't bomb Donetsk". Of course, this brings war into Donetsk, because there was a sustained desire to surrender Donetsk to the junta without war and bury the DPR. With this fact, the Strelkov spoiled the whole game for the defeatists, and also ruined Mr. Surkov's combinations on negotiating with Mr. Akhmetov, in which Mr. Strelkov simply had no place. No place for two reasons.

1. Mr. Strelkov represents the notational "party of war", which doesn't want peace with the junta and demands war until victory with raising a victory flag over Kiev.  There is simply no place for him in backstage talks with the junta and Mr. Akhmetov – fighting inside the Donetsk agglomeration will obviously lead not only to the prolonged confrontation, but also to major destruction, which will touch the numerous property of Mr. Akhmetov as well. This is not something he expected when he was flirting with the DPR, injecting his people there.
2. Mr. Strelkov, due to his right-wing monarchist beliefs is no stranger to right-wingers, nationalists, and even semi-fascists like Mr. Prosvirin, accepting aid from everybody who provides it, without being very selective and by the principle – give all - take all. Mr. Surkov and Co. don't need the right-wing Novorossia with a nationalist spirit, which some characters try to attach to Mr. Strelkov's image, who openly supports Putin and doesn't propose any state projects from his own name, although he was already ascribed the intent of capturing Rostov and march on to Moscow, which is obvious and utter BS.
People like Mr. Akmetov, Mr. Medvedchuk, Mr. Tsaryov, to whom in the case of creating "Donetsk Transnistria" power will be delegated, are much closer to a person like Mr. Surkov. People's people, like Mr. Mozgovoi or Mr. Gubarev are unlikely to have access to making the crucial decisions – these figures are more likely to scare those who are used to "deciding" everything in a close circle of "their own".

Also, the authorities are starting to scare themselves with a "patriotic Maidan", which is precisely the consequence of the course towards creating the "new Transnistria" pursued by Mr. Surkov through negotiations with Mr. Akhmetov. Those who yesterday were the members of the pro-Putin consolidated majority don't understand and don't accept the changed political course and first start to ask questions, then search for somebody to blame, and sooner or later they find the Kremlin. That is, it must be understood, that it is precisely this policy which destroys the pro-Putin majority and creates the threat of the "patriotic Maidan", which is only a potential consequence of the "Donetsk machinations" of Mr. Surkov. And here there is nothing new – it is worth reminding how the analogous "clever" combinations of Mr. Surkov in the domestic policy already caused mass turmoil in Moscow after the elections of December 4th, 2012, after which he was thrown out from the position of the curator of the domestic policy and after which Mr. Volodin came with his United People's Front and over less than a year arrested Mr. Surkov's disaster, moving the percentage of Putin's supporters from the official 36% in January 2012 to 86% in April 2014.

Now, apparently, history repeats itself – Mr. Surkov is starting to overplay it and exposes not only the DPR, but also Putin himself, by splitting the very "post-Crimean" pro-Putin majority, throwing out a fraction of patriots into the opposition, and constructing the paper tiger of "patriotic Maidan" out of yesterday's Putin supporters, which may be used by the Americans on the occasion, if they seriously start solving the question of organizing the real "Maidan". That is, in essence, by crying about the "threat of patriotic Maidan", the hurrah-guardians prepare the foundation for it by splitting the post-Crimean pro-Putin majority. This is, certainly, quite obvious for certain circles in Moscow, which is why Mr. Strelkov was, of course, warned about the situation that was forming in Donetsk. He shouldn't be imagined as some kind of Don Quixote. Therefore, when Mr. Strelkov's suspicions were augmented with the information about what was going on in Donetsk, the rapid breakthrough into Donetsk was organized, in order to nip the defeatist party in Donetsk in the bud, which threatened the very existence of the DPR with the following surrender of the whole Donbass and with a potential consequence – a revolution in the Russian Federation in the style of "Russian revolt lite".

Mr. Strelkov, having left the blockade under Slavyansk, already caused a partial exodus of the potential helpers in the dump of the DPR and the potential bargain with Mr. Akhmetov from Donetsk – the former commander of "Vostok" Mr. Khodakovsky, who was on Mr. Akhmetov's payroll (but who regularly travels in and out of Moscow anyway), departed Donetsk into the undisclosed location (into Mariupol, according to the rumors), the Ukrainian authorities, which quietly existed in Donetsk prior to Strelkov's arrival, also bid a hasty farewell, the military units that were previously not captured were cleansed, and today the Donetsk mayor Mr. Lukyanchenko suddenly departed the city into Kiev "for consultations". That is, Strelkov (at the probable suggestion of certain circles in Moscow) simply destroys the base of the collusion between the junta and Mr. Akhmetov, because surrendering the city together with a bunch of militia fighters who fight the junta will be unlikely, and Mr. Strelkov has one of the largest groups of armed men and a significant authority among the population of the DPR and the militia. This authority needs to be rapidly dismantled, because he is now becoming a threat for the policy being conducted.

This is why the propaganda campaign of "Strelkov-traitor" was launched, when various hypocrites try to throw mud at Strelkov, trying to save the crumbling combination of Mr. Surkov and Mr. Akmetov and Co. In this respect, of course, it is not worth focusing on Mr. Kurginyan and Mr. Bagirov, they are only the talking heads, which deliver a certain message related to the disappointment with the survival of Mr. Strelkov and his not allowing to "plot" in Donetsk in the style of "and then the forester came and told everybody to go home".
The hysterical nature of the campaign, which started at Mr. Kurginyan's suggestion (who became the initiator, but not the organizer) showed well that it was hastily prepared, that is why it ended up so unconvincing, and Mr. Kurginyan has finally become a complete joke – his allegations against somebody who held Slavyansk for 3 months against overwhelming odds and provided sufficient time to create a state, which due to those who are now scattering out of Donetsk and those who feel uneasy in the light of the arrival of Strelkov's men, wasn't created. In this respect, the lies of Mr. Kurginyan that "in Donetsk everything is OK" are also revealing, considering that Donetsk was on the border of betrayal and surrender.

If Mr. Strelkov's reputation won't be ruined, then of course they'll try to kill him, just like they already tried to kill Mr. Bolotov and today tried to kill Mr. Mozgovoi, who represent the "party of war". These people interfere with collusion and surrender, which is why they have to be either defamed or eliminated. In this respect, those characters who are now trying to throw mud at Mr. Strelkov in essence play into the junta's hand and into the hand of the defeatist party, which are preparing the surrender of Donetsk and the backstage collusion with Mr. Akhmetov. The question of what's more there – the material interest or the ideological convictions, is purely rhetorical. The internet dummies who picked up this wave represent only consumables of big politics, which is performed behind the backs of those militia fighters, who heroically fight against the superior junta forces every day.

Mr. Strelkov should not be idealized, he is not likely to become a decent statesman, and his ideological convictions are, frankly, quite special, but the thing is that by his actions under Slavyansk and by the efforts of the Russian propaganda, he turned from an unknown reconstructor into a serious political figure, behind which there are many armed men. He has to be reckoned with, he is being afraid of, and of course they will try to eliminate him – both the Ukrainian fascists and the Russian defeatists.
Here it must be understood that Mr. Strelkov is one of those on whom the real and not the virtual DPR is based on. The strike against people like Strelkov, Gubarev, or Mozgovoi is primarily a strike against the real DPR, where there is no place for Akhmetov, Khodakovskiy, or Medvedchuk. That is why the current situation around Strelkov is so revealing in the sense of uncovering the hidden enemies of the real independence of the DPR. So, please record the surnames and the nicknames of these characters, who act as the DPR undertakers voluntarily or out of ignorance. One has to know one's enemy.

Original article: (in Russian)

Tags: akhmetov, diplomacy, donetsk, donetsk people's republic, dpr, khodakovskiy, kurginyan, slavyansk, strelkov, surkov, war in ukraine

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