Some of us sincerely don't understand why after a certain point Mr. Strelkov, besides the summary of military action, also systematically utters quite pessimistic things. In fact, the reasons for this are quite transparent.
In May-June, after the political course that was changed in April (the question about a military intervention was put off the table on April 24th) started to affect the operational and tactical situation in Donbass, the military action gradually started to gain steam, reaching the situation, when the irregular militia was forced to fight the regular army. This scenario wasn't originally planned at the stage of seizing power in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Slavyansk – everything was laid out with the expectation of recognition by the Russian Federation and of the Russian military intervention.
After the start of active combat and after the change in political course, the question of covert support emerged on the agenda. In the context of Mr. Strelkov, so that it is clear – over the 3 months of fighting under Slavyansk he only had about 2-2.5 thousand people there (light firearms + heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, ATGMs (partially broken), several MANPADS, and so forth) a total of 3 tanks + the monument IS-3, several IFV and amphibious IFVs, 4 or 5 "Nona"s, several AA guns with the caliber of 12.7 and 23mm. This is about the size of a single convoy from a "military surplus store", which the junta is currently tracking every day. This is about everything that Strelkov got while sitting in Slavyansk for over 3 months and the bobtailed amount of aid was perfectly visible from what was driven out of Slavyansk and from the quite unimpressive trophies that the junta could show (1 IFV, a shipment of non-working ATGMs, several automatic rifles and mines).
All of that kept Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Nikolayevka, Semenovka, Krasnyi Liman, and other settlements with a force ratio of 1 to 3.5-4.5 to the enemy advantage.
That is, it must be understood that from the point of view of weapons the aid was coming, but was absolutely insufficient for fighting the enemy group of up to 10-12 thousand people, not to mention tanks, artillery, and aviation. That is why, as the military action was developing and as the enemy forces outgrew his own, Mr. Strelkov started to openly present claims, the general meaning of which could be reduced to the insufficiency of the aid.
Nevertheless, the curators of the Russian policy in Donbass (primarily this is Mr. Surkov, who was transferred a part of levers for managing Russian policy in Donbass, after Mr. Volodin was pushed aside from these processes) looked quite calmly as the junta was slowly but surely wrapping Slavyansk, closing the operational encirclement. They also looked calmly at the enclave in Soledar (it was preserved since March by the junta special forces – 100-150 people), where more than 1 million of guns were stored, which started to enter black market, falling into the arsenals of the militia fighters and punitive battalions for money (they started to trade approximately in the end of April-beginning of May, when old weapons started to show up in the side's arsenals in volumes). Actually, even Strelkov himself wrote in the Spring that he had to buy weapons from the junta officers.
Also, over the 3 months no coherent assault on the tank base in Artyomovsk was organized, where even according to pessimistic estimates there were up to 20-25 combat-capable tanks, not speaking about the possibility of repairing the more or less preserved machines at the account of fully broken ones. Over months nobody bothered to capture it, not even to speak about creating the unblocking force group, which would be able to carry out strikes against the junta convoys as they were wrapping Slavyansk. This would allow to hold on to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk further. But it so happened that Slavyansk was being surrounded and eventually was surrounded, and nobody even scratched in Donetsk. About Strelkov's reports they started to write BS that "because Strelkov is sad, this is a sign of success", although if looking at these reports now, then they actually reflected the worsening situation under Slavyansk objectively.
The reasons for this "ignoring" of Strelkov are understandable, while he was there fighting under Slavyansk, negotiations of Mr. Surkov people with Mr. Akhmetov people were ongoing in Donetsk, meanwhile in the city itself a conspiracy was growing with the purpose of giving the city away to the junta. The political underpinnings of these processes were already described in more detail here http://cassad-eng.livejournal.com/16909.html.
On July 2nd fighting started for Nikolayevka, which led to the loss of control over the last significant highway, through which Slavyansk was supplied. Mr. Strelkov got even more "sad", it became obvious that he together with Slavyansk and its garrison were long since underwritten and nobody was going to rescue them. On July 2-3rd, while street fighting in the surrounded Nikolayevka was still going on, where the Motorola squad was fighting heroically (even despite the betrayal of two field commanders who exposed a flank), a decision was made in Slavyansk to break out of the encirclement, it must be understood that this decision had both political and military justification – Mr. Strelkov was warned from Moscow that a surrender of the city was being prepared in Donetsk.
During the night between July 4th and 5th Strelkov successfully carried out a breakthrough, suffering only minor losses. By this he disrupted the backstage talks of Surkov's people with Akhmetov and Kolomoisky (through Kurginyan's people). The overall meaning of these talks consisted of the near-Kremlin circles, which were represented by Surkov, trying to negotiate with the Ukrainian oligarchs the question of "large Transnistria" made of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics through the Russian oligarchs (Fridman and XXX), which were to be headed by Tsaryov on a preliminary stage, on whom a part of funding channels for the South-East were locked.
The Donetsk mayor Mr. Lukyanchenko (fled to Kiev), the speaker of Novorossia parliament Mr. Pushilin (dismissed at his own request), the minister of the state security Mr. Khodakovsky (dismissed from the minister position, battalion "Vostok" reformed into a brigade and operationally reassigned to Strelkov's staff), the police general Mr. Pozhidayev (the Ministry of Internal Affairs administration was cleansed effectively right after the arrival of the Strelkov brigade into Donetsk) were marked in these contacts. All of these people were more or less connected to Akhmetov and so Mr. Antyufeyev was sent to cleanse the top of the DPR and cleansing he started after which the series of resignations followed.
Once the retreat of Strelkov disrupted the backstage negotiations, the military action sharply activated on the whole front – the Ukrainian oligarchs, which contacted Moscow, immediately became targets of an informational campaign, after the contacts of the Kolomoisky deputy Mr. Korban with Kurginyan's person, the campaign against Kolomoisky in the Ukrainian media took on a massive nature, even the traditional SBU dumps entered action, akin to the recording about preparing the harassment of Lyashko, the goal of which was to set the fascist radicals against one of their sponsors. Meanwhile the open announcements of Kolomoisky, Filatov, and Korban that the property of Akhmetov needs to be confiscated did not receive wide media support, the junta media actually started to defend Mr. Akhmetov, who already surrendered Mariupol to the junta, and was laying the groundwork for surrendering Donetsk.
After the disruption of the talks, the junta stopped hesitating in destroying cities and infrastructure altogether (since no chance remained of receiving them by the way of collusion with the masters of Kurginyan and Co. without a fight), because the control over Donbass could now be established only by military means.
After this, effectively immediately the militia received tanks, IFVs, artillery (D-30 howitzers and SPH "Gvozdika"), and MLRS in fairly significant quantity over just a few days. That is, so that it can be understood better, over a week the militia received more heavy weapons in their arsenal than over the 3 prior months. The immediately led to operational results – the "South cauldron" was formed, and the offensive that started on July 1st fizzled on July 13-14th on all directions. It is quite clear that if the material and technical aid that was provided in July was provided since May in the same amounts, then the fighting would now be going somewhere near Izyum and not under Donetsk. With this, even despite the current material and technical aid, which was provided and is provided, the velocity of accumulating manpower and equipment with the junta are still higher (even not taking the material, technical, and organizational aid from the USA and the NATO). That is why due to the overall numerical superiority in people and equipment, the junta regrouped after a loss and continued its offensive, attacking the weak locations of the front lines (the militia simply don't have enough people and equipment in order to cover everything equally well).
So that it is clear – Strelkov broke out into Donetsk with 1 tank, 3 "Nonas", and several IFV/amphibious IFV. To his aid followed 4 tanks, 3 SPH "Gvozdika", and several APC/IFV, somewhat earlier several "Grads" showed up under Donetsk. All of this fell on a wide front stretching from Snezhnoye through Donetsk to Gorlovka and next to the zone of Mozgovoi's responsibility. Whatever Strelkov could squeeze out of this for Mozgovoi he sent. Currenly his equipment is bound by the fighting for Marinovka and airport, and also provides the defense of Donetsk and Gorlovka. He simply has no forces for more.
Actually, his continued pessimistic announcement stem from an objective evaluation of the real relation of forces on the front lines. The fantasies on the topic of "The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is a fine chap." and "let the enemy have a lot of tanks and aviation, but with a prayer and morale we will break him" obviously cannot influence the difficult operational situation. That is why the "sadness" of Strelkov is in essence an attempt to deliver through the public (where he has wide support) to the authorities that he needs more weapons and equipment. Of course, such requests also go through closed channels – more subjectively and less emotionally. But this is just one of the aspects.
The second aspect of the "sad" announcements of Mr. Strelkov is a political one. The failure of the defeatist party with the surrender of Donetsk didn't lead to its destruction. As it is not hard to notice from the ongoing informational campaign against Strelkov, his presence in Donetsk clearly impedes the plans of collusion with the oligarchs and the junta on the topic of the future of Novorossia. Mr. Strelkov wants to fight and to go on Kiev, for this he needs people and weapons, which he is not receiving in sufficient quantities.
But because this idea has public support, open talks with the junta and the oligarchs on the topic of the future "large Transnistria" cannot be held. Mr. Strelkov, in essence, is not letting the idea of "large Novorossia" die, which Mr. Surkov and Co. for the most part scrapped already in the Spring. That is, Mr. Strelkov is a political obstacle for an attempt of a political exchange of Ukraine for the DPR and the LPR. Therefore, he will be blamed for all mortal sins (provocateur Kurginyan in the best style of Mr. Dorenko today gave birth to "Mr. Strelkov wanted to kill Putin, and so we have to understand that he hit "Boeing"), in order to clear the stage for the future collusion with the fascist junta about the future of the DPR and the LPR. Meanwhile, the military aid for the DPR will be graded in order to not let the whole resistance fold altogether (the variant of a complete dump of the DPR and the LPR for Kremlin looks burdensome), at the same time they are trying to cut off the channels of aid organized by the public – the resources of informational support for the DPR and the LPR are blocked, accounts are closed, also through a collusion between the Russian banks and the SBU and its masters.
The junta provocation with the "Boeing" was already picked up by the Russian party of defeatists, effectively playing into the junta propaganda, injecting theses that behind the downed "Boeing" there could be Strelkov and the militia, that is the attack on the DPR goes in so to say 2 hands – from one side it is attacked by the USA, its satellites, and the junta, from the other side – the Russian comprador-defeatists and their media servants, like Kurginyan. The injection about Putin, whom Strelkov wanted to murder was necessary in order to somewhere high above somebody would wave to stop supporting Strelkov – that is a picture is being created both for the public and for the highest leadership of the Russian Federation.
The overall meaning of this operation consists of the following – discredit Mr. Strelkov in the media (record who participates in this campaign, through this wave it is easy to determine who among the speaking heads is bound to Mr. Surkov and those who prepare the ground for a collusion with the fascist junta – this is the media infrastructure of the real fifth column, and not those liberasts (i.e., liberal pederasts) and buffoons who are usually passed as it) and to lay the groundwork for his replacement. If Mozgovoi or a part of territory around Donetsk will have to be dumped to achieve this, then this cannot be excluded, because this is the same way that they were recently laying the groundwork for the "heroical death of Strelkov in Slavyangrad". "The heroical death of Mozgovoi in Lisichansk" may end up quite convenient for them in order to continue attacks on Strelkov, who couldn't support him with his 4 tanks. The ideal variant is to close the military leadership of the DPR on Surkov and Co. in order to prevent any initiative, after which to start negotiating with the junta. While Strelkov and the field commanders like Mozgovoi are alive, these plans are obviously slipping, and the defeatists have to spend time and political capital on destroying Strelkov.
For Mr. Strelkov this attack is obvious, which is why like before he is trying to convey to the public and the authorities through publicity a simple idea that they won't be able to dump him so easily (that is he won't go silently to slaughter) and that decent aid is required for the successful war, appealing to the "party of war", which provides the real (and not the PR) shipments and which is interested in spreading uprising beyond Donbass. Obviously, he is not a solo hero and in Moscow there are structures which support him, otherwise he would long since be buried somewhere under Slavyansk.
The generalized meaning of this Moscow meddling is the following: the Strelkov variant is simple and clear and Strelkov formulates it "pessimistically" – either waging the war in Ukraine more actively, or a capitulation and transfer of military action to the territory of the Russian Federation, although on the background of the temper tantrums "everything is screwed up, all is dumped" this is a more realistic dichotomy, which was obvious since May. Mr. Strelkov isn't saying that "everything is screwed up", he is saying that the tendency is unfavorable. And the development of the situation confirms his conclusions.
The defeatist party, which gained weight after accepting the decision in April of not intervening militarily, still tries to sit on the already slid apart chairs of war and capitulation, trying to reach an agreement with the fascist junta (which is impeded by Strelkov) and the Ukrainian oligarchs, in order to obtain the eventual decision, which could be disguised as not a complete dump, on the background of the announcements from February-March 2014.
In this alignment, Mr. Strelkov, regardless of his view, had long since became the banner of those who want to continue fighting for the whole Ukraine or at least for its part. Strelkov's opponents already underwrote Ukraine and now are looking for an exit out of this situation, so that not to cause unrest in Russia itself, even if in the long-term perspective surrendering Ukraine will have catastrophic consequences for Russia. Therefore, while this opposition will continue, Mr. Strelkov will remain "sad" up until the moment when the choice between two knowingly unpleasant decisions will be made. Or until the moment of his death and receiving both unpleasant decisions in one package.
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1682909.html (in Russian)