Briefly on a number of important questions.
1. What's all the fuss about Putin's address that didn't happen, are they lying or aren't they? Actually, everything is simple, first they planned it, and then they cancelled it, announcing to the public that they didn't even plan it. Typical. This is the same way it was on April 24, when we were told that after the meeting of the Council for National Security and Defense of the Russian Federation an address by Putin regarding the military intervention should happen, but since the decision was made not to intervene militarily, then the address was cancelled and everybody was told that it wasn't even planned. So nothing new here. I think that they wanted to tell us something about sanctions from the first person, but postponed it for better times. In general, I didn't quite understand the temper tantrum on this topic.
2. Why was Borodai removed? Some time ago I was verbally abused when I wrote that Borodai is staying for now. They said that perhaps I'm shaking Borodai's boat. Actually, as I wrote already in July, our sources told us that at least 1 more high-ranking official in the DPR will suffer due to the return of Strelkov into Donetsk and the city surrender that didn't happen. Second names weren't named, but of course it was suspected that the one to suffer will be Borodai. That's how it turned out to be.
Borodai was Surkov's man, about which he himself publicly announced by calling the latter "our man in the Kremlin", under Borodai and the already resigned Pushilin, in Donetsk they did some crap for 3 months, under him a conspiracy was growing in the city (whether Borodai knew about it or not is a second question), the state in the civil meaning of this word frankly wasn't coming together, plus a screw-up with the "Boeing", when he blurted about the necessity of a truce with the junta without coordination. Overall, the chair was shaking under him since July. The arrival of Antyufeyev signified a radical cleansing of the highest military and political leadership of the DPR – keeping Borodai in mind, from the chair of authority were also removed Pushilin, Lukyanchenko, Khodakovsky, Pozhidayev. The horny hands of Bloody Gebnya performed something of a reboot of the DPR leadership.
The new appointee Zakharchenko, the commander of "Oplot". He represents the "party of war" to a successful finish. This way it can be stated that the security people press down the civil administration, eliminating even the hypothetical possibility for a collusion with the junta. It is already clear that if a state will be built, then only after the victory, because right now it is more important to subordinate all resources to the goal of achieving a military victory.
Zakharchenko's plus is that he is local. Acquaintances who worked in Kiev for Antimaydan in Mariinsky Park also say that he's an energetic and well up dude, but time will show how he will fit in this position (in an agreement with Moscow, of course). Regarding his relationship with Strelkov, then overall it is normal, no major conflicts were apparent, so here we can expect a fruitful collaboration. Time will show how this will affect the work of the Russian fifth column against Strelkov and Novorossia.
Overall, I don't think that Borodai's departure is anyhow a meaningful loss, because they also came up with some kind of advisory position for him, so that he wouldn't disappear from the DPR altogether suddenly.
3. They write about the captured trophies (http://russian.rt.com/article/44372 (in Russian) and http://voicesevas.ru/news/yugo-vostok/3538-ukrainskie-karateli-zaprosili-belyy-koridor.html (in Russian)) from the junta, was there really anything left? There is no precise number yet, some sources give the number of 40 vehicles, others give 54, yet others give 67. The technical state varies, there are some completely OK vehicles, there are some with technical malfunctions, there are some that were damaged during fighting, there is also complete junk (factory repairs required). The precise number of combat-ready vehicles will be clear in the nearest days, the talk of "hundreds of captured vehicles" appears overestimated (I dare to suppose that some are anticipating events and count chickens before they hatch by writing all vehicles that remain in the cauldron into trophies, even though there are scenarios in which they will be burned). The principal mass was captured in the cauldron and during the rout of the 25-th airborne brigade. But overall the success is clear and in the nearest days on the front lines of the DPR and the LPR we may expect serious increase of the number of vehicles with the militia, but even here I warn against premature jubilation, even with these trophies the junta still has several times more vehicles than the militia. But the gap is steadily closing since July. So if something can be rejoiced, then it is the tendency.
4. Is it true that several junta planes were shot down today?
Yes, it is true. It is worth noting the constantly growing might of Novorossia air defense, only over today they downed a Mig-29 (a Su-27 according to another version), a reconnaissance plane, and a transport plane. If the captured SAM "Osa" are operational, then the rate of junta aviation losses will only increase.
By the way this time the pilots couldn't flee to their own, they were captured by the militia fighters http://www.interfax.ru/world/390228 (in Russian).
5. Regarding tanks in Kiev, do they want to disperse Maidan with them?
I think that the tanks showed up in Kiev for the following reasons – a demonstration of force, with a hint that just in case they won't shy away from using them for dissolving the "Eurobumdan", plus they are also preparing them for the parade "for the independence day". There is not much sense in using tanks on Maidan, if the junta will dare to play out a scenario with a bloody mess, then even regular automatic riflemen will do just fine there. Although in the junta leadership there are so many people with a diagnosis from psychiatrists that I won't be surprised if they decide to crush the tents of "Banderstadt" with the tracks of "Bulats" and "Oplots".
Signs of crosses and tires are unlikely to impede this process.
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/1717724.html (in Russian)